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ABSTRACT. This paper offers a critical exploration of philosopher Kevin Corcoran’s pro-
posed Christian Materialism. Corcoran’s constitution view claims that we human persons are con-
stituted by our bodies without being identical with the bodies that constitute us. I will critically evaluate 
this view and argue that Corcoran has not successfully managed to ground a first-person per-
spective and intentional states in materialism. Moreover, Corcoran’s property dualism about 
mental states and the idea of the causally efficacy of such states seem incompatible with materi-
alism. Corcoran’s view of imago Dei is also explored and evaluated. Towards the end of the 
paper I put forward a brief defense of dualism in light of Corcoran’s critique. 
 





How we view human personhood is continuously evolving as modern sci-
ence challenges and alters our idea of what makes us human. Darwin’s the-
ory, many have argued, presented not just a challenge to biblical literalism, 
but also to our understanding of human nature. Several contemporary sci-
entists and philosophers maintain ‘that the person is but one substance—a 
physical body’ (Murphy 1998a:1). If dualism is no longer considered a ten-
able anthropological standpoint then we must find new ways of conceptual-
izing human personhood. In light of the perceived problems of a Cartesian 
dualist ontology, philosophers of mind have proposed a number of alterna-
tive positions: reductionism, non-reductive physicalism, emergentism, etc. 
In theological anthropology, the challenge has been to articulate an account 
of personhood that can meet the demands of scientific credibility, philo-
sophical coherence, ethical adequacy, whilst staying true to biblical portray-
al of humanity. 
* MIKAEL LEIDENHAG (PhD 2016, Uppsala University, Sweden). Email: mikael.leiden-
hag@teol.uu.se 
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Philosopher Kevin J. Corcoran has argued for a Christian materialist al-
ternative to the soul. This proposal seeks to steer between both a reductive 
version of materialism and a dualistic account of personhood and the soul. 
This paper will critically evaluate Corcoran’s proposal for theological an-
thropology. The paper will focus on both the philosophical plausibility of this 
Christian materialism, as well as the theological cost of basing one’s under-
standing of human nature on a materialist ontology. It will be seen in this 
paper that Corcoran seeks to make a first-person perspective and intention-
al states compatible with materialism. However, he does not successfully 
ground such phenomena in materialism, but leaves both capacities of the 
mind unexplained. Moreover, it seems as if the causal efficacy of mental 
states does not sit well with materialism. From a theological point of view, I 
will argue that Corcoran, given his materialism, is unable to uphold a ro-
bust account of imago Dei. This theological cost should make us skeptical of 
the suitability of materialism for theological anthropology. In the end, I ar-
gue that dualism remains a viable option for articulating human person-
hood.  
 
Christian Materialism and the Path beyond Reductionism and Dualism 
From a Christian point of view, critical reflection on human personhood 
cannot be reduced to philosophical curiosity. It is an essential task for the 
theologian to reflect on what makes us truly human and how our person-
hood relates to the rest of creation. Moreover, this debate is entangled with 
important contemporary ethical debates, including stem cell research, clon-
ing, and genetic and reproductive technologies. In order to come to an in-
formed decision on what technologies and therapies should be allowed for 
human beings we need to reflect on what makes a human, human. Moreo-
ver, a specific account of human personhood will affect our ideas of life af-
ter death, but also the claim that human beings are created in the image of 
God. 
Kevin Corcoran has launched an impressive defense of a materialist con-
ception of human nature. Materialism, according to Corcoran, is favoured 
by contemporary neuroscience. It is also philosophically coherent and is 
able to sustain a responsible ethical system that respects the value of life. It 
is also superior to both reductionism and dualism, according to Corcoran. 
The key aspect of Corcoran’s materialism is the notion of constitution. 
The constitution view states that ‘we human persons are constituted by our 
bodies without being identical with the bodies that constitute us’ (Corcoran 
2006: 65-66). Corcoran exemplifies this with a bronze statue. It is, he notes, 
‘possible for the mass of bronze to survive changes that would terminate the 
existence of the statue...’ (Corcoran 1999: 1). Moreover, one could destroy 
the statue, scatter the pieces, while the mass of bronze survives. The bronze 
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material could also be moulded into something else without introducing 
new material. Thus, the statue with its specific attributes is constituted by 
the mass of bronze, yet it is not identical to it. As Corcoran suggests, the 
statue possesses particular properties that are not shared by the piece of 
bronze, and given that they differ in properties they are not identical. Can 
this constitution thesis be applied on the relationship between personhood 
and the physical body of a human being? In order to answer this question 
we must first define what a person is. Corcoran argues that we can articulate 
a minimalist account of personhood. He writes, ‘I think we can say with 
some confidence that persons (human or otherwise) are, minimally, beings 
with a capacity for intentional states: believing, desiring, intending, etc.’ 
(Corcoran 1999: 2). Human persons are also constituted by biological bod-
ies, and those bodies are themselves constituted by smaller physical objects, 
i.e. cells. One can see on reflection that a ‘person’ and a ‘physical body’ dif-
fer when it comes to properties. Corcoran also suggests that they have dif-
ferent ‘persistence conditions’. That is, it is possible for my body to persist, 
to continue to exist, without having intentional states. Corcoran writes, 
‘Therefore, there is no conceptual impossibility involved in thinking about 
my physical organism continuing to exist while completely lacking a capaci-
ty for intentional states’ (Corcoran 1999: 3). There is nothing about having 
a physical body in terms of identity conditions that necessarily involves hav-
ing intentional states and having the capacity for a first-person perspective. 
In this way, the constitution view takes us beyond the person-body iden-
tity that is associated with a nothing-but materialism. However, Corcoran 
does not think that this irreducibility of the ‘person’ takes us in the direction 
of a dualism. Dualism, argues Corcoran, suffers from several philosophical 
problems and its ontological claims are incompatible with the deliverances 
of science. Dualism portrays human beings as composed of a physical body 
and a non-physical soul. But, there seems to be a tension between dualism, 
‘on the one hand, and both the neural dependence of consciousness and 
the seeming irrelevance of a non-physical soul in explaining certain features 
of our conscious mental life...’ (Corcoran 2016: 154). If dualism is true, ar-
gues Corcoran, neuroscience should be explanatorily irrelevant as our men-
tal life is located and grounded in a non-physical substrate; but, of course, 
neuroscience is highly relevant (Corcoran 2016: 156). 
How should one understand the imago Dei, the idea that we are created 
in the image of God, on this materialist view? Traditionally, being created in 
God’s image has involved the notion of an immaterial soul. Corcoran, how-
ever, argues that such an understanding is no longer adequate, given both 
philosophical and scientific problems with dualism. Being made in the im-
age of God means a lot of things. We, he suggests, ‘image God when we 
care for creation’, ‘we image God when we live in a loving relation to other 
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human beings’ and when we ‘invest ourselves in their flourishing and well-
being’ (Corcoran 2006: 81). Materialism does rule out a dualistic under-
standing of imago Dei, but not the various ways in which we image God in 
our lives (Corcoran 2006: 82). In this way, Corcoran seems to depart from 
what has been called the ‘structural view of the image of God’, according to 
which a specific component or capacity that humans possess ground their 
being in the image of God (Visala 2014: 102). Rather, Corcoran seems to 
adopt a performative or functional conception of imago Dei, suggesting that we 
humans act out our divine bearing and that we act as God’s representatives 
on earth (see Deane-Drummond 2012; Van Huyssteen 2006: 132-136). 
Such an understanding puts less emphasis on who we are and more on 
what we are called to do. 
 
Some Philosophical Problems with Corcoran’s Materialism 
Can Corcoran successfully defend his materialist ontology? I will argue for 
the following: Corcoran does not successfully ground intentional states and 
a first-person perspective in a materialist framework. Moreover, it seems as 
if Corcoran adheres to property dualism, but that such dualism does not fit 
his desired materialism. 
An important task for a materialist is to show how particular properties 
fit a materialist/naturalist framework, and why we should prefer a material-
ist interpretation of, for example, mental properties, moral values, and 
higher-level properties in general. Corcoran provides, I suggest, good rea-
sons for rejecting the nothing-but materialism. Reductive or eliminative ma-
terialists are unable to reduce higher-level phenomena, such as intentional 
states, capacity for first-person perspective, and that of being able to relate 
to other people. This is an important task, and I agree with Corcoran that 
these elements must be a part of any serious ontological consideration about 
what it means to be human. Corcoran, however, does not seem to actually 
ground intentionality and the subjectivity of consciousness in a materialist 
ontology. He remains strangely silent on a number of important issues: 
does his account amount to property dualism? Is there a supervenient rela-
tionship between intentional states and the material level? Is it appropriate, 
as the emergent theorist would have us think, to talk about human nature 
in terms of levels? 
Corcoran does not use the term supervenience explicitly, but it seems that 
his materialist account must assume some notion of supervenience. In the 
body-mind debate, the concept of supervenience means that whatever hap-
pens on the mental level must correspond to some event on the physical 
level. Whatever mental event that takes place, it must correspond to some 
physical occurrence in the brain. The mental, therefore, supervenes on the 
physical. On Corcoran’s account, intentional states should supervene on the 
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physical and the intentional is ontologically dependent on the body (no bio-
logical body à no intentional states). This seems to follow from Corcoran’s 
own constitution view and his claim that neuroscience demonstrates the 
intimate connection between the mental and the physical. 
The problem with supervenience is that it does not amount to an expla-
nation, and so mere ontological dependency is not enough to secure the 
constitution view. Jaegwon Kim helpfully explains that supervenience, by 
itself, cannot be considered a mind-body theory. He writes, ‘the mere claim 
of mind-body supervenience leaves unaddressed the question what grounds 
or accounts for it—that is, the question why the supervenience relation 
should hold for the mental and the physical’ (Kim 1998: 13). To apply this 
on the constitution view, to say that the person is constituted by the body, 
and ontologically dependent on it, does not explain how it is that something 
purely physical can give rise to intentional states and a robust first-person 
perspective. It seems as if this issue is left unanswered by Corcoran. 
Another problem for a general supervenience thesis is that it does not 
secure, in this case, Corcoran’s materialism. It seems as if it is compatible 
with a variety of other non-materialist frameworks/ontologies, including 
interactionist versions of dualism as well as dualistic understandings of 
emergence theory (which I will come back to later). In this way, the de-
pendency of the mental upon the physical alone cannot show the constitu-
tion view to be correct and superior to non-materialist ontologies. Super-
venience needs to be supplemented with some additional argument or posi-
tive reason for Corcoran’s view to be convincing. 
My second argument is that Corcoran is committed to property dualism. 
This in itself is not a problem, but it becomes one when the idea of irreduc-
ible properties is put together with materialism. Corcoran’s view of the ir-
reducibility of personhood means that there are particular properties, such 
as having the capacity for intentional states, which are not the same as pure-
ly physical states. While physical states persist, it is possible that intentional 
states cease to exist; hence, intentional states are not the same as and cannot 
be reduced to the physical level. Given this rejection of the reductionist 
identity thesis, as well as affirmation of the causal relevance of the mental, it 
is safe to assume that Corcoran holds to property dualism. Such dualism does 
not entail a robust Cartesian dualism. Instead, it claims that the world is 
made of one substance, yet there exists both physical and mental properties. 
But, how well does property dualism rhyme with a materialist ontology? 
Can someone who is a materialist about human creatures also maintain that 
there are irreducible mental properties? 
A materialist who subscribes to property dualism with regard to the 
mental maintains that mental properties are irreducible with regard to the 
physical base level. Whatever properties that characterise a material sub-
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strate are not sufficient for capturing the nature of the mental domain. 
Their ontology, therefore, is in some sense extra-physical, or perhaps even 
non-physical. Hence, on a materialist reading of evolution there would be 
only material processes in play, interacting to bring about higher complexi-
ty. However, can a purely material process give rise to something extra-
material or non-material? Would there be, one should ask, any adaptive 
value with regard to such properties? (Lycan 2013: 537). Substance dualism 
is often accused of not being able to reconcile the idea of the origin of im-
material substances in light of evolution. Yet, it seems as if a property dual-
ist that adheres to a strong notion of irreducibility faces a similar problem 
and is forced to produce some explanation for how mental properties can 
arise naturally from a thoroughly physical base level. Thus, we have an 
origin issue for this kind of property dualism. 
There is also a compatibility issue that needs to be address, which pertains 
to how irreducible mental properties can be combined with a materialist 
ontology. First, we have to make one thing clear: mental properties exhibit 
features that are not like physical/material objects. Intentional states involve 
a subjective dimension unlike the objects that are ‘revealed in ordinary 
sense perceptions or as uncovered in the physical and biological sciences’ 
(O’Connor and Churchill 2010: 279). Being a conscious creature—
possessing intentionality, beliefs and desires- means that there is something 
like to be that creature. David Chalmers writes concerning this subjective di-
mension: ‘To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious 
if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality of experience’ (Chalmers 
1996: 4). The problem for materialism is that such a qualitative feel does 
not seem to be derivable from material/physical properties. Indeed, Corco-
ran concedes this point in his constitution view: material stuff can persist 
while the mental does not, in a similar way to how some mass of bronze can 
persist despite the statue being shattered. In this way, Corcoran seems to 
admit that there is no relationship of derivability between the material and 
the mental, such that material properties necessitate mental properties. 
However, if a material substance does not necessitate mental properties, 
what do we do with them? If they are not derivable, nor necessarily necessi-
tated by material stuff, then how should we construe the ontology of mental 
properties? My suggestion is that if they are not derivable secondary prop-
erties, then they must be fundamental primary properties. As Susan 
Schneider argues, in order for the property dualist to explain the ‘funda-
mental nature of the mind we must posit consciousness as a basic ingredient 
of the universe, alongside the fundamental physical properties’ (Schneider 
2012: 67). This would save the properties of consciousness from being elim-
inated. Nevertheless, such a philosophical move should be unacceptable for 
a materialist, as it would take property dualism in the direction of 
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panpsychism—the view according to which mind and mental properties are 
fundamental constituents of reality. We maintain that Nancey Murphy’s 
non-reductive physicalism invites a panpsychist understanding of con-
sciousness (see Leidenhag 2016). To go down the panpsychist path is to 
abandon materialism as such, and many materialists would agree with this 
assessment. Thus, to hold to property dualism in the way that Corcoran 
seems to, undermines his materialist ontology. 
There is another problem for Corcoran’s materialist understanding of 
human nature. Corcoran emphasises the importance of relationality for his 
perspective, and for any serious philosophical and theological consideration 
of human nature. The Christian narrative stresses the importance of human 
beings forming relations: It is not good for a human to be alone, so God 
created another ‘human being for the first to stand in relation to’ (Corcoran 
2006: 74). The Christian story further brings out the importance of a rela-
tionship with God, with non-human animals, and to creation as a whole. 
Thus, the Christian narrative, from the beginning to end, portrays human 
beings as persons-in relation (Corcoran 2006: 74). Relationality is, however, 
not just embedded in the Christian narrative, it is also ‘causally essential to 
the emergence of a first-person perspective’ (Corcoran 2006: 74). It is not 
just that the capacity for relationality is important for an adequate under-
standing of what it means to be a person, it is in fact in a ‘deep sense consti-
tutive of personhood’ (Corcoran 2006: 75). 
Thus, the capacity for relationality is causally necessary for talking about 
personhood. And it is this capacity that sets Corcoran’s materialism apart 
from a reductive or eliminativist understanding of human nature. As Cor-
coran seems to suggest, relationality is a causal term in that it signifies a ca-
pacity for entering into relationships. Such capacity also involves intention-
ality; a person S desires, for example, to enter into a relationship with per-
son Y. That's why Corcoran wants to take his materialism away from the 
causal reductionism and determinism associated with harder forms of mate-
rialist/physicalist/naturalist ontologies. Such determinism is generally 
thought to be inconsistent with a Christian conception of what it means to 
be human, and being created in the image of God. Nancey Murphy, who 
proposes a very similar position to that of Corcoran, explains the need for 
causal anti-reductionism in this way: 
 
The question of causal reduction seems to be the one that matters for retaining 
our traditional conceptions of personhood… First, if mental events can be re-
duced to brain events, and the brain events are governed by the laws of neurolo-
gy (and ultimately by the laws of physics), then in what sense can we say that 
humans have free will?... Second, if mental events are simply the product of neu-
rological causes, then what sense can we make of reasons? (Murphy 1998b: 131). 
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This idea seems to be shared by Corcoran: a first-person perspective is es-
sentially tied to the capacity for relationality, and if that capacity is incom-
patible with a materialist outlook on the nature of persons then his anti-
reductionism collapses. 
However, can Corcoran uphold this anti-reductionist view regarding re-
lationality and intentional states in general? I suggest that he is unable to 
achieve this anti-reductionism and will argue: (1) his materialism makes in-
tentional states causally impotent, (2) if intentional states lack causal efficacy 
then such states are turned into epiphenomena (they cannot be considered 
real in an ontological sense). 
Mental causation is a tricky issue for materialism and it has frequently 
been used as an argument for dualism. A materialist is committed to the 
idea that material stuff should be sufficient for explaining mental phenom-
ena; that is, it is not permissible to invoke any dualistic categories. However, 
if it is the case that material interactions can fully explain the reality of the 
mental, then what conceptual space is left for the idea of the causal efficacy 
of mental states? (Hasker 1999: 49) Jaegwon Kim, who I mentioned earlier 
in this paper, has formulated the principle of ‘causal explanatory exclusion’ 
to capture the problem of mental causation. He argues that ‘there can be at 
most one complete and independent causal explanation, or one fully suffi-
cient cause, for any single event’ (Kim 1993: 291). The causal relevance of 
the mental becomes unclear if one suggests, as Corcoran does, that human 
creates are material through and through. A material cause, therefore, 
‘threatens to exclude, and pre-empt, the mental cause’ (Kim 1998: 37). Be-
cause of this problem, the materialist is forced to provide a positive account 
of how a mental cause and a material cause of a particular event are causally 
and ontologically related to each other. That is, Corcoran needs to explicate 
more fully the supervenience relationship between mental properties and 
their material base, which brings us back to the first objection. I argued that 
this form of supervenience is not systematically or properly explained by 
Corcoran. More worryingly for the materialist, the chance for such an ex-
planation does not seem promising. As Terence Horgan argues, it seems 
incredibly difficult to spell out how the material gives rise to the mental, and 
in what ways the mental supervenes on the material. He writes: ‘Although a 
physical supervenience base might always exist for any manifestation of 
aboutness [intentionality], in general any adequate nonintentional, nonse-
mantic characterization of the supervenience base might be enormously 
baroque and complex’ (Horgan 1994: 308). In order to characterize this 
relationship one might have to venture beyond the mind of the cognizer 
and include a vast external environment, perhaps it will include a massive 
number of physic-chemical interactions, and there might be no way to 
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translate intentional states into nonintentional language. The problem, 
Horgan argues, seems insurmountable. 
To conclude this section of the paper: Corcoran has offered an interest-
ing critique of reductive materialism. Yet, he has not successfully defended, 
or explicated, his non-reductionist take on materialism. It is unclear how 
mental phenomena, which are essential for his view of personhood, relate 
to the material. Moreover, there are strong reasons for thinking that a ma-
terialist cannot make sense of the causally efficacy of mental states, and that 
his restrictive ontology negates any hint of property dualism. Due to these 
kinds of problems, it becomes increasingly difficult to separate Corcoran’s 
constitution view from sheer reductionism. 
 
Philosophical and Theological Problems Regarding a  
Materialist Imago Dei 
It has been argued by Corcoran that materialism, at least on his non-
reductive model, can accommodate the central Christian claim that humans 
are made in the imago Dei. There is, according to him, nothing about a con-
stitution view of human nature that negates the belief that humans are cre-
ated in the image of God. I argued earlier that Corcoran seems to side with 
a performative or functionalist understanding of Imago Dei, namely that to 
image God is a matter of doing, not simply being. An important aspect of this 
performativism is that humans should develop good relationships with oth-
er people, non-human animals, and creation. Before raising a philosophical 
problem with this account, I would like to point out some theological issues 
that need to be addressed. 
The first issue that is in need of further clarification concerns people 
with autism whose ability for social interaction is affected. Autism is general-
ly diagnosed by abnormalities in behaviour, although the reason for the 
emergence of autism is unclear. There is a growing consensus, however, 
that there is no single cause behind autism, and that it may ‘involve multiple 
independent (though interacting) domains of neurological impairment’ 
(Brown and Paul 2015: 111). According to contemporary research it looks 
as if disrupted ‘connectivity or imbalance of connectivity [within the cortex] 
results in the limitations of social communication seen in autism’ (Brown 
and Paul 2015: 112). The imago Dei, on the constitution view, is closely con-
nected to the capacity for relationality, the ability to form relationships, and 
socially communicate with other people. How should we construe the no-
tion of imago Dei with regard to people whose ability for social communica-
tion, and relating to other people, is impaired? This is not to say that Cor-
coran is unable to respond to such issues in a materialist manner, but that 
such an emphasis on relationality creates further questions. 
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The second issue that I want to bring attention to is connected with the 
first one. If it is the case that certain people, for various reasons, are more 
or less apt at forming relationships, does that then mean that imago Dei is a 
matter of degree? Are some people simply better at imaging God in their 
daily lives and, if so, does that affect their status of being created in the im-
age of God? It is often assumed in theological discourse that the status of 
imago Dei is absolute, that no external factor can undermine or challenge the 
idea that individuals bear the image of God. Once again, this is not to claim 
that Corcoran’s ontology, by necessity, lacks the resources for responding to 
this issue. It is rather a call for clarification on the part of Christian materi-
alism. 
The third point that I want to bring up is in regard to the ontological 
dimension of the performative/functionalist/relational account proposed by 
Corcoran. Several people that turn towards relationalism in order to ex-
plain the ‘image of God questions’ do so because of the seeming problems 
with a dualist and structural/substantive account. It is claimed that such an 
account, whereby the imago Dei is construed in terms of particular capacities 
that are a part of our human nature (such as intellect, reason, and rationali-
ty), creates insurmountable metaphysical and scientific problems (Van 
Huyssteen 2006: 126). This turn from a substantivist to a relational under-
standing of what it means to be human, and being created by God, is 
claimed to sidestep some of the metaphysical problems of the former ap-
proach. For Alistair McFadyen, the substantive account ‘indicates something 
definite, fixed and stable: something, usually within each individual, which 
constitutes us as human and characterizes substantial, essential humanity’ 
(McFadyen 2012: 919). 
The idea seems to be that one can sidestep some of the metaphysical 
problems associated with a substantive view of human nature by adopting, 
instead, a relational and functional ontology that places priority on us act-
ing out divine imaging. I do not deny the value of such an account of the 
imago Dei, but it seems as if it too, in a similar way to the substantive view, 
encounters metaphysical issues. In stressing the relational character of hu-
man beings, Corcoran (and others in favour of comparable views) assumes a 
set of properties or capacities. That is, a person has the ability to enter into 
relationships with other people. This kind of ability consequently assumes 
the reality of relational properties, and such properties furthermore presup-
pose that we have certain capacities: ‘If we did not have the capacity to love, 
we could not enter into loving relationships, if we did not have the ability to 
think and reason, we could not undertake a commission to be God’s stew-
ards on earth’ (Stenmark 2012: 900). A relational property is also not a nec-
essary property; it is possible for a human being to be constituted by non-
relational properties. That idea, as we have seen, is be shared by Corcoran’s 
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materialism. If it is the case, however, that a relational ontology presumes 
certain properties and that those properties, in turn, rely on cognitive ca-
pacities, then a materialist has to show how such properties and capacities 
can be ontologically explicated. 
This, of course, takes us back to my three philosophical critiques of 
Christian materialism: (1) the supervenience relationship between mental 
states and material states are not explained, (2) property dualism is irrecon-
cilable with materialism, and (3) materialism cannot uphold the causal rele-
vance and efficacy of mental states. The performative / relational account of 
the imago Dei rests on certain philosophical assumptions about human na-
ture that, while important for a robust conception of personhood, do not fit 
a materialist narrative of what it is that makes us human. There is a deep 
tension within Corcoran’s materialism between his ontology and what he 
seeks to achieve in the theological domain. It seems as if we need to reject 
this materialism and pursue some other less restrictive framework for un-
derstanding human nature and human beings as being in created in God’s 
image, even on a performative / functional interpretation of this doctrine. I 
have briefly described Corcoran’s rejection of dualism and I will in the next 
section put his arguments against dualism under scrutiny. 
 
Evaluating Corcoran’s Critique of Dualism 
Corcoran’s push towards materialism is in part motivated by perceived 
problems with a dualistic account of the body-mind relationship. Earlier in 
the paper I hinted at a couple of reasons for Corcoran’s rejection of dualism 
and we will now look at those reasons more closely. 
Corcoran argues that dualism seems out of touch with contemporary sci-
ence and that the mental-material relationship seems difficult to explain if 
one introduces an ontological distinction between mental and material 
causes. I suggest that Corcoran launches three arguments against dualism: 
(1) A dualist account of consciousness does not square with contemporary 
neuroscience which suggests a strong relationship of dependency between 
mind and matter; (2) Neuroscience shows that our capacity for complex 
experiences develops. But, as a soul lacks parts it cannot develop in any 
meaningful sense; (3) The intimate body-mind relationship makes the idea 
of a non-physical soul causally irrelevant. 
Corcoran, in a similar way to other physicalists and materialists, points 
towards neuroscientific data and concludes that such data shows the superi-
ority of materialism over dualism. What the field of neuroscience shows, 
according to Corcoran, is the intimate connection and fine-grained de-
pendence between mental properties and the material states of and interac-
tions in the brain. He provides examples from the neuroscientific literature 
that seemingly demonstrate how mental states are physically realized, how 
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‘distinct aspects of experience are implemented in anatomically neural 
structures’ (Corcoran 2016: 155). The phenomenon of Blindsight is put 
forward as an example of this. Such condition ‘renders patients who suffer 
from it able to ‘see’ without consciously seeing’ (Corcoran 2016: 155). In 
such a scenario, a patient is shown a spot of light in their blind field of vi-
sion and asked ‘what do you see?’ The patient will, not unexpectedly, an-
swer ‘nothing’. Yet, if the patient is asked to locate the spot of light by point-
ing, then he/she can do it with very high precision. Thus, the patient is see-
ing without consciously seeing. This kind of fine-grained dependence of 
experience on neural activity, however, would not be possible on dualism, 
argues Corcoran. Indeed, ‘the kind of neural activity mapped out by the 
neurosciences should be explanatorily irrelevant to its [conscious experi-
ences] occurrence and character’ (Corcoran 2016: 156). This gives us in-
stead reasons to believe that all forms of experience are physically imple-
mented, which speaks heavily against dualism. 
This conclusion seems unwarranted for a few reasons. Even if there are 
mapped out correlations between mental and physical states, such correla-
tion in itself does not answer the issue if physical states cause particular ex-
periences. This is what Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato argue when 
they write: 
 
Thanks to neuroscience, we know a lot more about the neural processes involved 
with arousal, sleep, memory, perception, free will, motor control, and imagery. 
Unfortunately, we don’t know anything about the physical processes that give rise 
to consciousness or, more poignantly, about the physical processes that are con-
sciousness itself (Manzotti and Moderato 2014: 87). 
 
Correlation, as suggested by Corcoran, does not answer if mental content 
can be reduced to physical causation. This kind of neuroscientific account 
that Corcoran appeals to does not explain the nature of the correlation, 
and it does not show why it is the case that some physical process should 
bring about a mental state. Indeed, the correlation is left unexplained and 
treated as a brute fact. In a similar way to how supervenience is not 
properly explained, neither is this correlation. In this way, Corcoran’s ma-
terialism is brought closer to what has been called mysterianism; that is, it is 
simply a mystery how the mental emerges from the brain (Flanagan 1992: 
8-11). What Corcoran needs to demonstrate is that every mental event is 
sufficiently physically caused. But such a task does not seem achievable. It 
is, for example, logically possible for a mental event to take place without 
any correspondence to a neurological event in the brain. This is, I confess, 
a speculative idea but it is certainly possible for mental event Y, in the logi-
cal sense, to obtain without a correlation to physical event X. 
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/20/17 3:37 PM
 Christian Materialism and the Quest for Human Personhood 95 
PERICHORESIS 15.2 (2017)
This objection from neuroscience raises a further issue to consider: Is 
mental-physical correlation really a problem for a committed dualist? Dual-
ism comes in many versions and some would accommodate brain correla-
tions better than others. I want to suggest that an articulation of dualism 
that takes seriously the embodiment of human creatures can respond to 
Corcoran’s neuroscientific critique in an adequate way. Both Charles 
Taliaferro’s intergrative dualism and William Hasker’s emergent dualism 
seem to be up to the task. On Taliaferro’s dualism, there is not radical bi-
furcation between the person and the body; instead, a healthy person is an 
embodied functional unity that interacts with the world through his/her 
body (Taliaferro 2014: 198). When I kiss my wife it is not simply a soul 
kissing her. For a kiss to be possible there needs to be a ‘combination of 
intentional movement, embodiment, and expression’ (Taliaferro 2014: 
198). 
Nevertheless, the mental realm is ontologically fundamental and irre-
ducible to whatever the sciences reveal about the physical world, and so 
this position falls within the dualistic category of mind-body frameworks. 
This is similar to Hasker’s emergent dualism. This dualism starts from an 
emergentist conception of the mind. The mind is an emergent phenome-
non in that it appears due to interactions at the physical level. But, com-
pared to other versions of emergentism, Hasker maintains something 
stronger than just the appearance of a new property. The emergence of 
mind amounts to a new substance, or what he dubs an emergent individual 
(Hasker 1999: 188-197). Emergent dualism, thus, combines the basic 
emergentist idea, that consciousness is intimately connected with the phys-
ical, with the substance metaphysics that is generally taken to be constitu-
tive of dualism. 
It seems as if Corcoran’s critique falls short in light of an intergrative or 
emergent conception of dualism. Taliaferro’s and Hasker’s proposals do 
not assume an unbridgeable gap between mind and body, nor do they 
subscribe to the ‘ghost in the machine’ type of dualism. A dualism accord-
ing to which persons are holistic unities would expect there to be mental-
physical correlation, it would not come across as an ontological anomaly; 
on the contrary, such correlation follows from the basic ontological com-
mitments of what it means to be a person. 
Corcoran argues, moreover, that emergence of more complex experi-
encing and more complex conscious capacities seem better fitted to mate-
rialism. But, if the dualist picture is true then this gradual development 
seems very problematic as it is hard to imagine how a non-physical and 
partless soul can develop in any meaningful sense. How should we re-
spond to this objection? I think, similarly to his first objection, that this 
anti-dualist critique seems to be based on a non-interactionist and Carte-
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sian form of dualism. Hence, given this gap between the mental and the 
material, it is very hard to make sense of increasingly complex mental 
states and experiences. 
What Taliaferro and Hasker show, though, is that a dualist can happily 
concede the reality of mind-brain correlation. It seems further possible to 
maintain the gradual development of more complex forms of experiences. 
While the soul as such does not develop (or increases or decreases in any 
particular capacity), when matter is suitably configured it allows for multi-
faceted mental states and more complex causal interactions with the world. 
An interactionist model, furthermore, provides a two-way model for the 
mind-brain relationship, whereby the increased complexity in the brain 
not only allows for more complex experiences, but that a particular ‘field 
of consciousness in turn modifies and directs the functioning of the physi-
cal brain’ (Hasker 1999: 195). It is often claimed that a dualist cannot 
make sense of the evolutionary development of consciousness. Richard 
Swinburne, another prominent dualist, argues that such claims are un-
founded. It is perfectly coherent for a dualist to argue that during the 
course of evolution the soul gradually passes ‘from being passive and struc-
tureless, to being structured and active, structured by causally influential 
beliefs and desires. Mutations of genes gave rise to organisms with brains 
which in certain environmental circumstances occupied states which gave 
rise to sophisticated and causally efficacious desires in the soul’ (Swinburne 
2007: 297). Of course, the critic could retort and say that the possibility of 
more complex experiences is due solely to the difference in relationships 
between material constituents, and that the concept of a soul brings noth-
ing to the table. The ‘soul talk’ would be epiphenomenal. 
This brings us to Corcoran’s third critique, that the soul is causally and 
explanatorily irrelevant. The thrust of this critique is that the more we find 
out about the neural activities of the brain, the more explanatorily irrele-
vant a nonphysical soul appears. Contrary to this critique, I maintain that 
the soul is not only explanatorily relevant for explaining mental life, but 
that it is indispensable for explaining the successfulness of human practic-
es. 
We have seen that materialism, even on Corcoran’s non-reductive ac-
count, is unable to make sense of the causal efficacy of mental states. Mate-
rialism makes such mental states ontologically dependent on the physical 
happenings of the brain and, hence, causally redundant. This is the prob-
lem of epiphenomenalism, that a mental state is a mere by-product of 
‘neurophysiological causes of behaviour that does not itself contribute any-
thing to ‘the go’ of the world’ (Walter 2009: 85). As I explained earlier in 
this paper, through Kim, if one holds that there is only physical-to-physical 
causation, then the mental becomes ontologically superfluous. Indeed, to 
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maintain that there are events that do not have physical causes would be to 
concede the defeat and insufficiency of a materialist anthropology. Epi-
phenomenalism is caused by an overly restrictive ontology that views mate-
rial properties as the basic stuff of reality, and so the solution seems to be 
to find an ontology that can make sense of why there are mental properties 
and how such properties allow for human creatures (and possible other 
high-level animals) to have agency and free will. Moreover, we intuitively 
view ourselves as autonomous agents, and it seems as if mental causation is 
integral to the ‘manifest image’. Dualism, in virtue of being less restrictive, 
seems more able than a materialist ontology to explain the reality of men-
tal causation, how it is that we can affect our environment. In matters of 
explanation dualism is not irrelevant, for it can shed light on the relation-
ship between mind and reality, how it is possible for the mind to ‘hook up’ 
with an external environment. 
In addition to providing ontological resources for explaining causal 
powers of mental properties, dualism is explanatorily relevant in the sense 
that it can account for the unity of consciousness. When we have a con-
scious experience, we might have a multiplicity of them: we might smell 
something delicious, spot a beautiful tree, and feel pain, all at the same 
time. The interesting thing is that these experiences are connected in a 
significant way; they are unified and seem to belong to a single state of 
consciousness. In a healthy state, free from neurophysiological disorders, 
we interact with the world as a unified subject. But how can we explain this 
phenomenon of unity if, as it is claimed on materialism, that our conscious 
experiences are a product of a multitude of neurological firings and inter-
actions in the brain? Such multiplicity of physical happenings, it seems, 
should give rise to a multiplicity of disparate experiences. This speaks 
strongly against a materialist understanding of mind, whereby ‘I’ am in 
some sense identical to or (as Corcoran claims) constituted by physical pro-
cesses. The situation seems to be this, ‘whatever properties we encounter 
in the world, these properties are co-presented for us in a unified experi-
ence—or, we may also say, to a single subject’ (Hasker 1999: 134). This sub-
ject, moreover, cannot be identical to the physical processes within the 
body for such identitism would lead us back to the unity-of-consciousness 
problem. The subject must be ontologically independent of such processes. 
This does not constitute a proof of dualism, but I make this argument to 
show, once again, the deficiency of materialism and the explanatory pro-
spects for a dualism that regards consciousness as irreducible to the physi-
cal. 
Lastly, a form of dualism that maintains the irreducible character of a 
first-person perspective seems indispensable for our human practices. In-
tentional psychological properties make it possible to have beliefs about 
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reality, and they make it possible to ‘deliberate about ends and means, and 
assess the rationality of actions and decisions’ (Kim 1993: 214). Intentional-
ity makes normative and evaluate practices philosophically coherent and 
practically possible. However, I argued that materialism ends up denying 
intentional states, and undermining the reality of consciousness. Such a 
conclusion, however, is devastating for the coherency of materialism. Cor-
coran, in his materialist philosophical endeavour, is engaged in an evalua-
tive practice, assessing the rationality of dualism and makes positive argu-
ments for materialism. To base one’s intellectual practice, such as philoso-
phy, theology or science, on an ontological framework that ends up (as I 
have argued) excluding the mental realm is devastating and leads to inco-
herence. Corcoran, as a philosopher, seeks intellectual clarification, but 
such a practice of clarification is not possible given a materialism that sig-
nificantly casts doubt about the reality of consciousness. The mental realm, 
and the reality of intentionality, is assumed in several central human prac-
tices, but such an assumption cannot be squared with materialism. This 
does not prove dualism per se—indeed it is compatible with both 
panpsychism and idealism—but it takes us away from the limited frame-
work of materialism and the constitution view proposed by Corcoran. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to offer a critical evaluation of Kevin 
Corcoran’s Christian Materialism. I have argued that his constitution view 
is unable to support a robust first-person perspective and intentional 
states, as well as the causal efficacy of the mind. Hence, Corcoran’s anthro-
pology comes dangerously close to the kind of reductionism that he seeks 
to escape. It was also seen that his account of the imago Dei contained both 
philosophical and theological problems. I also evaluated Corcoran’s cri-
tique of dualism. Based on William Hasker’s and Charles Taliaferro’s em-
bodied dualisms, I suggested that Corcoran’s critique falls short and that 
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